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Transatlantic Environmental Security in the 1970s? 
NATO’s “Third Dimension” as an Early 
Environmental and Human Security Approach 
Thorsten Schulz  
Abstract: »Transatlantische “Umweltsicherheit” in den 1970er Jahren? Die 
“Dritte Dimension” der NATO zwischen Umwelt- und menschlicher Sicher-
heit«. This paper deals with the early stages of NATO’s “Committee on the 
Challenges of Modern Society” (CCMS), established as environmental “Third 
Dimension” of the Alliance in 1969. It discusses “environmental security” as a 
prime CCMS motive, assuming that the early CCMS-pioneers already pro-
jected global environmental uncertainty factors as security threats to the Atlan-
tic Alliance. NATO’s environmental concept already showed elements of envi-
ronmental and human security being considered in the face of the 
environmental crisis. The interrelation between both is examined by means of a 
knowledge-based history approach on the example of the CCMS “Road 
Safety” project (1970-1974). In the course of the project, NATO’s environ-
mental security assumptions turned into a technological leitmotif dealing with 
technically controllable environmental risks as well as basic human and indi-
vidual needs for security in a technological society. Therefore, the CCMS pro-
vided technical solutions to environmental and security policy problems and, 
finally, did not develop any political patterns of acting as a risk orientated envi-
ronmental alliance. 
Keywords: Environmental Security, Human Security, Transatlantic History, 
NATO, Environmental History, Environmental Conflict, Environmental Prob-
lems, Road Safety, Knowledge Development, Knowledge Society, Knowledge 
Transfer, Scientification, 1970s. 
 
In July 1969, Apollo 11 discovered another unexpected spacecraft during its 
spectacular moon landing mission: Planet Earth. The pictures from outer space 
showed mankind impressively that the blue planet was a unique and tremen-
dous “spaceship”.1 But it was also a highly fragile planet, as scientists and 
doomsday prophets alike warned at the same time. Trained in the art of predic-
tion, they opined grimly that a worldwide environmental crisis would lead to a 
global environmental breakdown within a few decades.2 Simultaneously, social 
movements such as the New Left challenged the political system as well as the 
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1  Höhler 2008, 65. 
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economic and social order of Western societies with their ecological rhetoric 
and critique of consumption.3 
In this tense atmosphere of environmental insecurity, the newly elected 
American president Richard Nixon introduced the idea of a new transatlantic 
task to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On April 10, 1969, the foreign 
ministers of NATO celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alli-
ance in Washington DC and Nixon used his home advantage in order to take 
his audience by surprise. In addition to its political and military tasks, he stated, 
the alliance was missing out on a “third dimension” – the social and natural 
human environment:  
The industrial nations share no challenge more urgent than that of bringing 
20th century man and his environment to terms with one another – of making 
the world fit for man, and helping man learn how to remain in harmony with 
his rapidly changing world.4 
In order to master this task, Nixon proposed the creation of a NATO 
“Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society”, which was eventually 
established in November 1969 and later became known as the CCMS.  
The following paper deals with the creation of the CCMS and examines 
whether its work contributed to the emergence of an environmental security 
regime.5 Moreover, it analyzes how human security tied in with environmental 
concerns. At the onset of the 1970s, “environmental protection” and “environ-
mental policy” were almost synonymous items. “Environment” was equivalent 
to the livelihood of man and covered the natural as well as the social human 
sphere.6 Since this implied a strong anthropocentric component, the paper uses 
this contemporary meaning of “environment” in order to ensure that contempo-
rary and today’s connotations are not being intertwined. According to Jakob 
von Uexküll, the natural and social interdependency of “environment” was 
interpreted as that surrounding influences are deeply relevant to the life and 
                                                             
3  Zelko 2006, 26-28. 
4  The White House (Office of the White House Press Secretary), “Address of the President at 
the Commemorative Session of the North Atlantic Council, April 10, 1969”, in Public Re-
cord Office, CAB 164-642, 4/130. 
5  It is part of a larger project on “Environmental Security in international European politics, 
1969 to 1975”, which uses the examples of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
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of early environmental security regimes within NATO, the European Union, the United Na-
tions and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The PhD is mentored by 
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has been a PhD fellow of the Schmittmann-Wahlen Foundation, Cologne, supported by the 
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6  Hartkopf and Bohne 1983, 2-4. 
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survival of a biotic community (Lebensgemeinschaft).7 Against this backdrop, 
the paper defines “environmental security” for a state as the absence of threats 
against the environmental preconditions essential to the well-being of its popu-
lation and to the maintenance of its functional integrity.8 
Researchers have often enquired about Nixon’s motives for putting the envi-
ronment on NATO’s agenda.9 Today, a cluster of reasons appears to be com-
prehensible, ranging from the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance or the 
reduction of domestic political pressure evolving from social unrest within 
Western societies to the need to establish an effective international environ-
mental protection regime. The following paper, however, represents the first 
attempt to analyze environmental security as a prime CCMS motive, its central 
assumption being that the early conceptualization of the CCMS already in-
cluded insecurity considerations such as the global deterioration of the natural 
environment. In contrast to those political scientists who assume that contem-
porary forms of environmental security only emerged with the end of the Cold 
War, I argue that they were already being developed at the onset of the 1970s.10 
The second part of the paper focuses on the interrelation between environ-
mental and human security within the NATO context. While examining the 
CCMS project on “Road Safety” (1970-1974) by means of a knowledge-based 
approach to environmental history, it pays particular attention to the production 
of “human security” and the realization of an early CCMS “environmental 
security” concept – the former being interpreted in terms of today’s United 
Nations concept which indicates a turn away from state-centered securitization 
towards new threats to “human security” such as crime, health, migration, 
poverty, unemployment etc. – and finally, environmental destruction.11 In 2003, 
the Commission on Human Security (CHS) acknowledged that “people’s secu-
rity around the world is interlinked” and defined “human security” as an indi-
vidual approach 
protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building 
on their strengths and aspirations [… by] creating systems that give people the 
building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood […] It complements state 
security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not 
been considered as state security threats. By looking at ‘downside risks’, it 
broadens the human development focus beyond ‘growth with equity’.12 
                                                             
7  von Uexküll 1909, 5. 
8  Frédérick 1999. 
9  Blaney 1973, 236; Kyba 1974, 256; Train 1974, 167; Sudarskis 1976, 69; Bungarten 1977; 
Krusewitz 1985, 33-47; Ditt 2003; Hünemörder 2004, 141-147; Humblin 2010, 54. 
10  For example, Matthew 1999; Dyer 2001, 441; see also the contributions to the “17. Forum 
Globale Fragen” discussing the worldwide implications and risks of the global climate 
change: Auswärtiges Amt 2007. 
11  United Nations Development Programme 1994, 22-40. 
12  Commission on Human Security 2003. 
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On the face of it, “human security” appears too vague to be of analytic 
value. However, international organizations such as the United Nations pursued 
the concept further and states such as Canada or Japan fell into line with it, 
which reflects a recent shift in social moral concepts and a rethinking of to-
day’s globally interconnected human security issues.13 I argue that the first-
generation projects of the CCMS already produced some decisive aspects of 
human security. This paper examines the way in which this production of secu-
rity knowledge interlinked human with environmental security. 
“… Are we prepared to see New York underwater?” – 
CCMS Pioneers and the Environmental Crisis 
The head of the West German CCMS delegation, the parliamentary secretary 
Ralf Dahrendorf, opened the first plenary session of the committee in Decem-
ber 1969 by stating that “the very fact that this Committee has been created 
shows that for us security depends as much on the vitality of our societies as it 
does on the strength of our armies.”14 Indeed, security was an intrinsic factor of 
CCMS considerations from the beginning, although NATO itself only used an 
extended security definition officially from 199115 and the first concrete CCMS 
study dealing with “Environment and Security in an International Context” did 
not appear until 1995.16 
On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the considerations of 
1969 already foreshadowed the findings of the 1995 study. Since in 1969 the 
term “environment” was defined as social and natural human environment,17 
the predicted global environmental crisis was perceived as an urgent threat to 
the vitality of Western societies. Or, as the NATO Information Service argued 
in 1970: 
The survival of human society as we know it – perhaps the survival of Man 
himself as a species – is threatened now by a new factor: the rapid deteriora-
tion of the globe itself as an ecological system […] The world-wide ecological 
crisis (for crisis it is) has […] the components of potential breakdown.18 
This NATO perception of the global ecological crisis as an uncertainty fac-
tor for mankind stems from one of the spiritual fathers of the CCMS – Nixon’s 
                                                             
13  Daase 2009. 
14  “Statement by State Secretary Dahrendorf at the first Meeting of NATO Committee on 
Challenges of Modern Society on 8 December 1969 in Brussels”, in United States Govern-
ment Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Papers of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: Part I, 
Richard M. Nixon Administration, 1967-1972, Subject File, I:292. 
15  Ziegerer 1998, 33-35. 
16  Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 1999. 
17  Concerning the contemporary perception of the environment as a social and natural issue, 
see also Uwe Lübken’s paper in this volume. 
18  Huntley 1972, 11-12. 
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presidential counselor on urban questions and head of the US Delegation at the 
CCMS Preparatory Committee, Daniel Patrick Moynihan – the “number one 
‘Urbanologist’ … in the White House”.19 
Moynihan was the driving force behind the CCMS, although his assessment 
of the CCMS’s role and importance differed markedly from Henry Kissinger’s 
approach to NATO’s third dimension.20 Kissinger perceived the environmental 
subject in the first place as a promising way to consolidate the transatlantic 
alliance.21 Therefore, beyond all intentions to protect the environment, the 
CCMS was indeed a primary vehicle to achieve a cohesive transatlantic policy. 
In the face of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military structures in 1966 
and the credibility dilemma of NATO’s leading member state USA,22 at least 
the political cohesion was meant to be strengthened by the agreeable “soft 
politics” of the environment, “adding internal strength to our external secu-
rity”.23  
Moynihan, in contrast, assessed NATO as the appropriate platform to fight 
the social and natural environmental problems of the industrialized nations.24 In 
terms of world policy, he perceived the environmental question as one of the 
most urgent international political issues, although he acknowledged internally 
that the environmental issue did not have enough integrative power to keep the 
Atlantic Alliance alive without any military-political functions.25  
                                                             
19  Joseph Glazer, “An Urbanologist in the White House”, in Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 142-
5009; “Daniel P. Moynihan, biographic Data”, in “Behandlung von Umweltproblemen 
durch die NATO”, September 1, 1969, in Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 142-5009; Katzmann 
1998, Appendix A: Biographical Facts Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 181-195. 
20  Russel E. Train (EPA) to Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State), “Future of the NATO 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society”, November 21, 1973 (confidential), in 
National Archives and Records Administration. General Records of the Department of 
State, RG 59, Political and Defense Files, 150-66/67-2899. 
21  Kissinger 1968; Memorandum Kissinger to Nixon, “Clarence Streit Letter on Atlantic 
Union”, August 27, 1969, in National Archives and Records Administration. Nixon Presi-
dential Material: President’s Office, President’s Office Files, Handwritings Box 2. 
22  Haftendorn 1994; Nixon 1968, 805; “Die Zukunft der NATO” 1969, 46; Brosio 1967, D23. 
23  Department of State, “Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger. Your Meeting with 
NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio, July 3, 1969 / Briefing Memorandum”, July 2, 
1969 (secret), in National Archives and Records Administration. General Records of the 
Department of State, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 150-64/65-3160. 
24  Moynihan to Nixon, “Memorandum for the President: NATO Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society”, September 16, 1969 (confidential), in National Archives and Records 
Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: President’s Office, President’s Office Files, 
Handwritings, Box 3; Memorandum Moynihan to Nixon, “Report on CCMS”, March 21, 
1970, in National Archives and Records Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: The 
National Security Council (NSC), Central Files, NSC-CenFiles-312. 
25  Memorandum Moynihan to Nixon, “Report on CCMS”, March 21, 1970, in National 
Archives and Records Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: The National Security 
Council (NSC), Central Files, NSC-CenFiles-312. 
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With regard to the CCMS’s conception, papers of its Preparatory Commit-
tee (PrepCom) reveal that security aspects already played a prominent role in 
the creation of the new organization. In the PrepCom Moynihan defined as the 
challenges of modern society 
to protect individuals and society from the unheeded effects of technological 
change [, …] to minimize the harmful effects that arise from imperfect use of 
technological developments, to achieve a more effective use of technology 
and more human forms of complex systems to the end of extending welfare 
and freedom of individuals and strengthening the bases of world peace.26 
He concluded that “the stability and well being of nations rests fundamen-
tally on the success with which they face these challenges”.27 His statement 
formed the basis of the North Atlantic Council’s report on the proposed CCMS. 
For the first time, the Americans cited concrete examples of this new type of 
environmental insecurity factor. As Moynihan wrote to Nixon: 
We pointed out that at the expected rate of release of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere by fossil fuels, the temperature of the atmosphere could rise 7 de-
grees by the year 2000. [...] Carbon dioxide has the same effect of glass in a 
green house [and ...] this [...] could raise the level of the sea by 10 feet. What 
then would become of London, Hamburg, Amsterdam, [and] New York?28 
Essentially, he resumed some specific recommendations of the President’s 
Science Advisory Committee of 1965, which had informed President Johnson 
that “marked changes in climate, not controllable through local or even national 
efforts”29 could occur. In comparison, Moynihan created a more complex worst 
case scenario. The inversion of his arguments reveals that he expected social 
and political instability, deterioration of the quality of life and the environment 
and finally a threat to all world peace efforts. 
In terms of the domestic environmental policies of NATO’s members, this 
interdependence manifested a more complex dimension than conventional 
environmental efforts so far ever realized. The PrepCom assessed the environ-
mental destruction as a global uncertainty factor concerning NATO’s integrity 
– a theory the Western diplomats were confronted with for the first time.30 
                                                             
26  “Report of the Chairman on the Discussion in the Preparatory CCMS on Subjects which the 
CCMS might consider”, September 16, 1969, in National Archives and Records Admini-
stration. Nixon Presidential Material: President’s Office, President’s Office Files, Hand-
writings, Box 3. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Moynihan to Nixon, “Memorandum for the President: NATO Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society”, September 16, 1969 (confidential), in National Archives and Records 
Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: President’s Office, President’s Office Files, 
Handwritings, Box 3. 
29  President’s Science Advisory Committee 1965, 9. 
30  Moynihan to Nixon, “Memorandum for the President: NATO Committee on the Challenges 
of Modern Society”, September 16, 1969 (confidential), in National Archives and Records 
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Moreover, Moynihan already calculated costs resulting from environmental 
risks in comparison with the CCMS expenses. He summarized that the actions 
would cost a vast sum – but in the face of the environmental threat, capital 
spending appeared unavoidable: “If we conclude that the carbon dioxide pro-
jection is sound, are we prepared to see New York underwater?”31 With this in 
mind, Moynihan worked along the same lines as scientists on both sides of the 
Atlantic, such as for instance Paul Ehrlich who was criticized in the US as a 
doomsday prophet because he discussed the global greenhouse effect32 or Sir 
Frank Fraser Darling in the UK who explained the causal relationship between 
the environment, technology, and potential security threats to posterity.33 Dar-
ling argued that it was a dangerous misconception that only later generations 
would have to deal with environmental problems. As Moynihan consulted 
Darling’s results,34 his CCMS concept assessed the critical environmental 
situation in a symptomatic way. In October 1969, he told the North Atlantic 
Assembly that the threat of a “nuclear holocaust” had been regarded so far as 
the ultimate disaster to humanity. But now “it has come to be perceived that 
this would be only the most spectacular of the fates that might await us. […] 
An ecological crisis is surely upon us; and developing at quite extraordinary 
rates.”35 As CCMS pioneers like Moynihan considered Western society and 
mankind as such to be endangered by the global environmental deterioration, 
the CCMS of 1969 expressed a programmatic shift from state to societal-based 
security, as Christopher Daase explains.36 Therefore, the development of the 
CCMS shows vividly that society substituted the state as main security interest 
at the onset of the 1970s, gradually shifting in the dimension of space (from 
national to global level), danger (from threat to risk), point of reference (from 
state to society to the individual) and subject (military, economic, ecological 
and finally human security).37 
                                                                                                                                
Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: President’s Office, President’s Office Files, 
Handwritings, Box 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 McCormick 1989, 69-73; Hünemörder 2004, 219-221. 
33 “Not with a bang but a Gasp”, The New York Times, December 15, 1969; McCormick 1989, 
129. 
34 “Remarks by Daniel P. Moynihan on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society”, 
Brussels, December 8, 1969, in United States Government Library of Congress, Washing-
ton D.C., Papers of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: Part I, Richard M. Nixon Administration, 
1967-1972, Subject File, I:292. 
35 “The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. Address by Daniel P. 
Moynihan, North Atlantic Assembly”, Brussels, October 21, 1969, in United States Gov-
ernment Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Papers of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: Part I, 
Richard M. Nixon Administration, 1967-1972, Subject File, I:292. 
36 See Christopher Daase’s paper in this volume. 
37 Daase 2009, 138-149. 
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For all these reasons, security was an intrinsic factor of CCMS considera-
tions. NATO’s environmental concept already showed elements of environ-
mental and human security being considered in the face of the environmental 
crisis. However, since we cannot take our present knowledge as a yardstick, it 
would be wrong to regard the CCMS concept as a matter of course. Images of 
destruction such as the “Deepwater Horizon” disaster or scientific reports on 
global warming were not established in the collective consciousness. Regarding 
the level of experience and science at the end of the 1960s, Moynihan did not 
present generally agreed facts – rather, he and other CCMS pioneers advanced 
a working hypothesis for NATO’s environmental initiative. What Moynihan 
and the North Atlantic Council did was not to create or complete an environ-
mental security paradigm. It was a thought process which aimed at the combi-
nation and investigation of environmental and security factors under NATO 
conditions. CCMS projects were to show to what extent environment and secu-
rity really were interconnected and to combine technical, ecological, and social 
factors with the political courses of NATO’s actions. In this respect, the Third 
Dimension was really a new political initiative which marked a period of tran-
sition in NATO’s political strategy from conventional concepts of “peace” and 
“security” to an early form of environmental security. 
“… Tens of thousands of scarce engineering man-hours” – 
Road Safety Knowledge and the Production of “Human 
Security” 
In 1970, eight CCMS projects started in a new type of pilot-copilot model on 
Disaster Relief (USA), Road Safety (USA), Air Pollution Control (USA), Open 
Water Pollution (Belgium), Inland Water Pollution (Canada), Work Satisfac-
tion in a Technological Era (UK), Scientific Knowledge and Political Decision 
Making (FRG), and Regional Planning (France).38 The pilots expected an ex-
tensive transatlantic environmental technology transfer. Almost every operation 
aimed at the exchange and development of environmental technology. The 
United States in particular attracted large technological projects, which prom-
ised economic and national benefits closing the apparent mutual American-
European “technological gap” in the environmental field.39 Business journals 
                                                             
38  Pilot nations of the CCMS projects are listed in brackets. If interested, one “pilot” nation 
took up a certain environmental problem and led a corresponding research project. Thus, 
the pilot was responsible for its planning, financial expenditure, organization and results. 
Within the project, “copilot” nations were able to establish subprojects on more concrete 
problems.  
39  “Examples for U.S. in meeting the ‘Challenges of Modern Society’”, February 2, 1970, in 
United States Government Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Papers of Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan: Part I, Richard M. Nixon Administration, 1967-1972, Subject File, I:292; 
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predicted expanding environmental technology markets while economists 
considered the environmental sector as the “next big industry”.40 Such techno-
logical innovation appeared only feasible in cooperation with national indus-
tries and companies. Thus, the CCMS projects gave American and European 
industry the opportunity to improve in the field of environmental engineering.41 
As the example of the Road Safety project illustrates, industrial science and 
engineering facilities became heavily involved in the CCMS research and tech-
nology exchange. 
To analyze the scientific process of the CCMS and the production of secu-
rity knowledge within its projects, this paper historicizes the sociological con-
cept of “knowledge society” (Wissensgesellschaft).42 The concept assumes that 
knowledge-based actions such as information processing, expert systems, and 
symbolic analysis permeated societal processes and relegated traditional factors 
of reproduction to the background.43 The review of the Road Safety project 
pays special attention to the former aspect. According to the sociologist Nico 
Stehr, it was the growing significance of science after 1945 which enabled 
society to influence itself, its social institutions and its relations to the natural 
environment.44 With regard to environmental history, critics have complained 
that this view was too euphoric about scientification and neglected “non-
scientific knowledge” and its “non-professional producers” such as the envi-
ronmental movement.45 Nevertheless, since the CCMS projects were run exclu-
sively by a group of scientists and experts, a historically reconsidered definition 
of Stehr’s thesis is worthwhile. In the context of the CCMS, “knowledge-
based” chiefly signified engineering and the natural sciences. Overall, as I 
                                                                                                                                
Memorandum Dr. DuBridge to President Nixon, “The Technological Gap”, February 19, 
1969, in National Archives and Records Administration. Nixon Presidential Material: The 
National Security Council (NSC), Central Files, NSC-CenFiles-442; Memorandum Dr. 
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ogy with Europe”, February 20, 1969, in National Archives and Records Administration. 
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40  “Gewinnchancen für eine bessere Umwelt”, Business Week, April 11, 1970; Quinn 1971, 
120. 
41  Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Science and Technology Department (Ronald Arculus), 
“NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society: U.S. Study on Road Safety: Pro-
posal on Air Bags (Passive Restraints Systems)”, April 23, 1970, in Public Record Office, 
CAB 164-643: 42; Moynihan to Bundeskanzleramtschef Horst Ehmke, June 10, 1970, in: 
United States Government Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Papers of Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan: Part I, Richard M. Nixon Administration, 1967-1972, Subject File, I:292. 
42  Concerning the methodical advantages of the concept see Szöllösi-Janze 2004, 277, 310-
313. 
43  Wilke 1998, 161. 
44  Stehr 1994, 220. 
45  Uekötter 2006, 102, 104-107; Uekötter 2006, 145, 147-148; with regard to scientification in 
the environmental field – especially concerning the “amateurish knowledge” of the envi-
ronmental movement – compare Radkau 2002, 309. 
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argue, the Road Safety project produced a CCMS-specific environmental 
techno-science knowledge which dealt with security risks in traffic and mobil-
ity and defined individual human security for driving and, thus, living condi-
tions.  
The project on Road Safety46 was once again the brainchild of Patrick 
Moynihan. Throughout the 1960s, he pursued a new approach to the subject, 
stating that “traffic accidents constitute one of the greatest, perhaps the great-
est, of the nation’s public health problems.”47 He criticized the American auto-
mobile industry and government for their reluctance towards an efficient road 
safety methodology. There was no relevant data available, nor had any scien-
tific and technological projects been pushed ahead: 
The only moderately reliable statistic that exists is the number of persons 
killed […] It is hardly a complicated matter to conceive what basic national 
data ought to be collected: rates for deaths, injuries, and accidents; geographi-
cal and temporal distribution as such; types of vehicles involved; types of 
driver failure; types of vehicle failure; types of drivers involved; types of 
roadway and environmental failures […] To repeat: none of this data now ex-
ists, save the death rate.48 
Moynihan advocated not only producing adequate cars but also developing 
traffic systems able to minimize potential accidents. In this respect, he raised 
the question of individual risk limitation and individual security in a techno-
logical society. With this in mind, he defined road safety, in the first place, as a 
scientific task and not only as a matter of bureaucracy. 
However, NATO’s road safety project went far beyond this projection. It 
aimed at the combination of automotive engineering, human and ecological 
factors as well as accident prevention and investigation to produce a “highly 
effective format … bringing all dimensions of the problem and their interrela-
tionships into sharp focus.”49 In order to harmonize Western road safety stan-
dards, it intended that all interested states should be able to draw conclusions 
from a catalogue of technological insights.50 This matrix consisted of six sub-
projects on (1) emergency medical services, (2) road hazards, (3) increasing 
use of seatbelts, (4) alcohol and driving, (4) passive restraints, (5) accident 
investigation and most importantly, (6) the development of an Experimental 
Safety Vehicle.51 
                                                             
46  Accredited by the North Atlantic Council in February 1970; see NATO Doc. C-R(70)5, 
February 13, 1970. 
47  Moynihan 1966, 10, quoted according to 20. 
48  Moynihan 1966; italics used in the original text. 
49  “Road Safety. Summary of proposed pilot study” 1970, 19; quoted according to 22. 
50  United States Department of Transportation, “US Pilot Study on Road Safety for the Com-
mittee on the Challenges of Modern Society. Proposed Agenda, Implementation and Work-
ing Plan”, February 6, 1970, in Public Record Office, FCO 55-451: 2. 
51  Huntley 1971, 23-26. 
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Mobility and traffic are important parts of the anthropogenic environment. 
Consequently, it was not as peculiar as it seems at first sight that the CCMS 
developed traffic guidance systems, airbags or safety cars. Contemporary fig-
ures showed that in the United States 55,000 road deaths and 3.5 million in-
jured persons were estimated in 1968 alone.52 In 1965/66, the death toll from 
traffic accidents numbered 111,000 NATO-wide – almost as much as the losses 
suffered by the UN forces in the Korean War.53 In addition to driving safety, 
the subprojects covered important environmental matters such as the develop-
ment of a pollution-free car and better emission measurement technology. In 
this way, Road Safety was directed at reduced CO2 emissions and less urban 
smog.54 
The number of growing cooperation partners indicates that no major auto-
motive nation wanted to miss the technology transfer within the project. The 
Europeans were particularly interested since the American National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 set new motor vehicle safety standards in the 
US.55 Car and motorbike manufacturers such as AMF, Ford, Fairchild Indus-
tries and General Motors (USA), Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Opel, BMW 
and Porsche (FRG), British Leyland (UK), Fiat (Italy), Peugeot, Renault and 
Citroen (France), Nissan, Toyota and Honda (Japan) as well as Volvo and Saab 
(Sweden) worked in subprojects on safety measures, new kind of propulsion 
methods and Experimental Safety Vehicle prototypes (called ESV in the follow-
ing). Road Safety turned out to be a big business investment: By 1974, the state 
and private capital investments for the ESV subproject itself amounted to 250 
million US dollars.56 The same year the project presented 13 different ESV 
variants, designed corresponding to mass production standards and the pur-
chase interests of prospective buyers.57 
International conferences, trade fairs and car exhibitions such as the Frank-
furt Internationale Automobil-Ausstellung (IAA) (1970), the ESV conferences 
in Paris (1970), Stuttgart (1971), Washington, DC (merged with the transport 
fair “TRANSPO ’72” (1972)) and Ann Harbor (1973) formed an extensive 
“space of automotive engineering knowledge”.58 Within this knowledge space, 
government officials, state facilities, non-governmental organizations and 
actors alike met and established a horizontal and vertical cooperation between 
national departments of transportation, federal agencies, car and insurance 
                                                             
52  “Road Safety. Summary of proposed pilot study” 1970, 19. 
53  Huntley 1971, 23. 
54  “NATO move to encourage pollution-free cars”, The London Times, October 20, 1970. 
55  US want air bag safety at 85₤ car”, The London Times, July 8, 1968; “American safety laws 
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associations, independent and government-sponsored research institutes as well 
as research facilities of the world’s most important car manufacturers. 
Throughout the project, technical engineers of the car industry dominated 
the scenery and established an environmental knowledge concerning the style 
of the ESV. As a result, there was no competition between different scientific 
knowledge systems, but rather cooperation among the prevailing fields of the 
project. Up to 1977, the number of scientists, experts and government represen-
tatives integrated together in such CCMS projects increased to an annual aver-
age of more than 1,000 persons meeting at 30 conferences and workshops.59 
Within the projects, scientists and engineers established subject-specific com-
munities and networks extending beyond the operations, as three former CCMS 
experts explained: 
During the pilot study, the ‘community’ of experts communicate directly with 
each other, often by telephone. These connections […] often continue even af-
ter the conclusion of the pilot study. […] The interaction within the scientific 
‘communities’ is the real medium of reciprocal transmission of technology 
[…] and it is the CCMS’ greatest achievement and greatest success.60 
Owing to these networks, the national boundaries set by the CCMS pilot 
model became blurred, and researchers and experts exchanged their views and 
results inside and outside “their” scientific community. In consequence, trans-
national collaborative company and research interconnections developed, for 
instance exchanging experiences on airbag or catalytic converter know-how.61 
The Road Safety community obtained its knowledge mainly from experi-
ments, for example crash tests and experimental emission measurements, as 
John A. Volpe explained: 
Auto design engineers […] have thrown themselves into the ESV task with 
unparalleled enthusiasm. Top company managements have unhesitatingly 
committed millions of dollars to the ESV program. They have allotted tens of 
thousands of scarce engineering man-hours to the project and have con-
structed and equipped extensive new test facilities. Governments have come to 
the support of these efforts by undertaking new research at government cen-
ters, as well as underwriting a great deal of private research.62 
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The experiments of the “test facilities” formed the arsenal of information 
through which the CCMS experts legitimized “their” redefined environment 
before science, politics, and society.63 While “scientists” produced new knowl-
edge, “experts” reproduced it as a feasible subject. At the ESV conferences and 
car exhibitions, automobile and traffic experts made their technical knowledge 
available to an expertise-demanding clientele in politics, bureaucracy, industry 
and the media.64 Because of their ability to transform the flood of information 
and data into scientific insights, products, and expertise, the automotive engi-
neers and technical-administrative experts possessed a powerful knowledge of 
interpretation and orientation.  
Road Safety experts coined the image of the technological as the “environ-
mentally suitable” know-how. As this kind of environmental techno-science 
knowledge evolved in the course of the projects, the CCMS’s idea of environ-
mental protection shifted in line with market conditions towards a predominant 
technology-centered approach. For example, American, European, and Japa-
nese engineers worked on the environmentally most suitable and most profit-
able propulsion method. They presented Catalytic converters and new types of 
propulsion such as turbine engines, electric and hybrid drives as well as a re-
vised sterling engine.65 The project’s experts established the eco-friendly auto-
mobile as being market-conforming, announcing that “the ‘clean car’ of 1975 
will also have to be a ‘safe car’”.66 
Simultaneously, this CCMS techno-science redefined “environmental 
threats” as technologically controllable “environmental risks”. Specific mecha-
nisms of risk limitation were anticipated in a kind of a “safeguarding technol-
ogy complex”, closely corresponding to Ulrich Beck’s sociological concept of 
“risk society” (Risikogesellschaft).67 Although it is questioned by environ-
mental historians for various reasons today,68 some of its sociological ideas are 
still worthwhile in a historicized way.69 According to Beck, environmental risks 
are basically invisible and based on causal interpretations. They are extremely 
dependent on experts’ knowledge as they are influenced by social processes of 
definition.70 In the case of the knowledge production within the CCMS pro-
jects, transatlantic researchers and experts dealt with regionally invisible envi-
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ronmental risks such as the greenhouse effect or acid rain.71 Besides these, 
visible risks such as road accidents appeared on the research agenda. Beck 
excluded “road accidents” from his analytical risk pattern, arguing that they are 
“attributable to the individual” and “chanced voluntarily”.72 However, the 
historical reality differed as the development of road safety represented a con-
crete attempt to control social risks of modern technology and society. Joachim 
Radkau correctly pointed out that the 20th century’s rise of mass motorization 
in particular accepted social and individual risks to a high degree.73 With this in 
mind, conventional automobiles and the extensive postwar highway networks – 
such as the one created by US town planners on the assumption of endless 
cheap fossil energy74 – appeared as uncertainty factors to an increasingly mo-
bile automotive society. 
Against this backdrop, the Road Safety project created, in a bottom-up proc-
ess, a post-modernist risk management of social and individual human mobil-
ity. Experts’ reports and feasibility studies demonstrated technological pros-
pects in the control of potential human security threats such as the “road 
accident”. Therefore, the project exemplifies a process of professionalization, 
indicating that the 1970s’ production of human security was still centralized in 
the hands of a few experts who generated and consolidated new realities in 
everyday life.75 At the onset of the 1970s, this techno-science culture of envi-
ronmental innovation participated in standardization and harmonization proc-
esses and thus influenced automobile design and culture. Whether it concerned 
airbags or seat belts, pedestrian protection devices or crash systems, catalytic 
converters or engine design – American and European car buyers of the 1970s 
and 1980s were confronted with a new kind of functionalist safety car design 
shaped by state legislation, scientific experts, consumer demands for safety and 
environmental features, and a new type of overall technological safety philoso-
phy.76 
Conclusion 
The analysis has shown that early CCMS pioneers such as Patrick Moynihan or 
Ralf Dahrendorf already anticipated present scientific and political environ-
mental security discourses. Unlike other contemporary observers, they were in 
the position to formulate a first environmental security thesis for NATO’s 
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environmental activities, which failed for two reasons: On the one hand, the 
prevailing mood within the Alliance towards the CCMS initiative was “respon-
sive in principle but cautious in practice”.77 Important allies such as the United 
Kingdom were not enthusiastic about NATO’s new third dimension for finan-
cial reasons, because of duplication of work with other international environ-
mental organizations and conceivable political implications such as the impres-
sion of a bloc-to-bloc politicization within the environmental field.78 Therefore, 
the CCMS focused its attention in a top-to-bottom process upon technological 
options rather than political grand designs. The nature of the Alliance was too 
restricted to provide political or scientific answers for global environmental 
problems.79 On the other hand, assertive large-scale projects like the Road 
Safety project established a prevailing techno-science culture of environmental 
innovation which left its mark on the CCMS’s objectives. The CCMS as such 
did not steer the “eco-technological policy line” all by itself. Rather, it was the 
knowledge production within the projects which developed an efficacious 
power of definition and promoted environmental technology only in a bottom-
up process. Whether it was oil tanker design, disaster relief, contingency plans 
or air pollution control: At the end of the day, this power was so decisive that 
“the heart of the NATO CCMS programme was […] to stimulate a significant 
exchange of technology amongst a major group of industrialized nations of the 
world”.80 
Consequently, the CCMS projects of 1970 did not examine the global envi-
ronmental security hypothesis projected in 1969. In a tacit understanding, all 
projects took a technological turn, leaving “environmental security” virtually 
aside. The Road Safety project demonstrates that the task of investigating envi-
ronmental and security factors under NATO conditions very quickly turned 
into a technologically dominated leitmotif dealing with basic human and indi-
vidual needs for security in a technological society. The activities established 
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international and transnational bodies which produced specifically safeguard-
ing knowledge and expertise in their field of research. If “technology” is de-
fined as manufacture and application for a specific purpose, the project aimed 
at individual human security. It linked road safety to the security of the indi-
vidual by exploring the environment from a technical perspective. Basic human 
needs such as the freedom to move were redefined in terms of a general techno-
logical safety philosophy. As a first major international organization dealing 
with road safety and individual security, NATO anticipated present human 
security discourses such as the United Nations Habitat “Global Report on Hu-
man Settlements 2007” which explicitly defines road safety as a human secu-
rity issue while bringing together security and safety in one urban policy con-
cept.81 
In the face of the CCMS pioneers’ ambitious vision, NATO’s environmental 
committee nevertheless produced a sobering outcome. Although its projects 
indicated for the first time the complexity of “environmental security” and 
“human security”, these two elements were not integrated into a political 
framework of action. Rather, the specialists of the CCMS provided technical 
solutions to environmental and security policy problems. Even if individual 
human security was considered, at no point did the CCMS projects develop an 
analytical pattern of environmental or human security combining technical, 
ecological, and social uncertainty factors and risks with political courses of 
action. Owing to this, NATO and its environmental projects did not develop 
any political structures or objectives of acting as a risk-orientated environ-
mental alliance. Only at the end of the 1970s did NATO discuss that it had to 
bear in mind ecological, scientific-technological and social factors on a global 
and long-term basis.82 However, as the Cold War heated up again, NATO’s 
environmental dimension lost significance. Once more Western diplomats 
fought on familiar terrain and focused on military-political matters. It was not 
until the lifting of the Iron Curtain that NATO’s policy-makers retrieved the 
environmental security dimension assumed by their predecessors and revived, 
unknowingly, Moynihan’s idea of 1969 as an integral part of the Atlantic Alli-
ance. 
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